Given the sequential update nature of Bayes rule, Bayesian methods nd natural application to prediction problems. Advances in computational methods allow to routinely use Bayesian methods in econometrics. Hence, there is a strong case for feasible predictions in a Bayesian framework. This paper studies the theoretical properties of Bayesian predictions and shows that under minimal conditions we can derive nite sample bounds for the loss incurred using Bayesian predictions under the Kullback-Leibler divergence. In particular, the concept of universality of predictions is discussed and universality is established for Bayesian predictions in a variety of settings. These include predictions under almost arbitrary loss functions, model averaging, predictions in a non stationary environment and under model miss-specication. Given the possibility of regime switches and multiple breaks in economic series, as well as the need to choose among dierent forecasting models, which may inevitably be miss-specied, the nite sample results derived here are of interest to economic and nancial forecasting.
Introduction
Bayesian methods have gained increasing importance in empirical work. In this respect, macropolicy modelling is one of its success story. Indeed highly dimensional macroeconometric models are often estimated an analyzed within a Bayesian framework (e.g. Sims and Zha, 1998 , and the reviews The goal of these application is to infer something about the future from past information, when interest goes beyond point prediction. Motivated by the prediction problem, we will study the theoretical properties of Bayesian predictions which satisfy an important property called universality.
The goal is to present general results about universality of Bayesian predictions. Some results are new, while others are known, though not necessarily in the form presented here and not in the econometric literature. All these results fall within the same unifying approach and their generality should induce the reader to consider the Bayesian approach as an ideal forecasting method. We consider optimal prediction under arbitrary loss function and optimal model averaging. We also consider the case when the optimal model changes over time and we wish to track these changes as much as possible. In these cases, the straight Bayesian update will not lead to a satisfactory prediction and some additional randomization over the models or parameters is required. Finally, we show that if the true model does not belong to the class of parametric models considered, the Bayesian predictor performs as well as the best parametric model in the class under no additional assumptions. Establishing a similar result in the maximum likelihood context would require more stringent conditions (e.g. Strasser, 1981 , and Gourieroux et al., 1984 , for results related to this claim, Phillips and Ploberger, 1996 , for asymptotic connections between Bayes and maximum likelihood methods).
Improvements in computational power and the presence of a rich number of computational methods have made possible to routinely use Bayesian methods in practice (e.g. Chib, 2004 , Evans and Swartz, 1995 , Geweke, 1989 . Moreover, results concerning dimensionality reduction may further alleviate the computational burden (e.g. Cardigan and Raftery, 1994, for Bayesian model averaging). Computational issues will not be discussed here and the interested reader should consult the above references.
Bayesian prediction is based on the natural principle that new collected evidence should be used to update predictions in a forecasting problem. Bayes rule satises optimality properties in terms of information processing (e.g. Zellner, 1988 , Clarke, 2007 and Bayesian estimation requires weaker conditions for consistency than other methods like maximum likelihood estimation (e.g. Strasser, 1981) . Predictions based on Bayes rule lead to forecasts that perform uniformly well over the whole parameter space. Forecasts satisfying this property will be called universal. This only requires a mild condition on the prior, i.e. the prior needs to be information dense at the true value (e.g. Barron, 1988 Barron, , 1998 . It is a remarkable fact that this condition is not sucient for consistency of posterior distributions (e.g. Diaconis and Freedman, 1986, Barron, 1998 ).
There is a rich statistical literature on consistency of Bayesian procedures (e.g. Barron, 1998 , for a survey) to which the results of this paper are related. However, the present discussion will also bring together ideas and results from a rich literature in information theory (e.g. Merhav and Feder, 1998), articial intelligence (e.g. Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2005, Hutter 2005), and game theory (e.g. see special issue in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 29, 1999). It is not possible to provide a review of the results in all these areas. However, each the theorems stated here will be followed by a discussion of related references.
The focus of the paper is theoretical. However, its conclusions have clear practical implication for the use of Bayesian prediction and provide guidelines for the choice of prior. The choice of prior is not crucial as long as it satises some general conditions. Under additional smoothness conditions on the likelihood w.r.t. the unknown parameter, the optimal choice of prior is known to be related to the information matrix (i.e. an exponential tilt of Jeries' prior) and more details can be given (Clarke and Barron, 1990 , for exact conditions), but will not be discussed here.
While conducting inference to distinguish between two hypotheses, the posterior odd ratio represents the evidence in favor of one hypothesis relative to another. The posterior odd ratio is aected by the prior distribution. Hence, the Bayesian prediction and estimation problem contrasts with the testing problem, where the choice of prior is more crucial (e.g. Kass and Raftery, 1995, Section 5).
The plan of the paper is as follows. At rst we provide background notation and denitions. We introduce the denition of universality of predictions and give a game theoretic justication for it, linking it to the prequential and real time econometrics literature. Section 2 states the universality results for a variety of problems including prediction under almost arbitrary loss function, model averaging, predictions in a non-stationary environment and predictions under miss-specication.
Further discussion including remarks about the conditions can be found in Section 3. Proofs are in the appendix.
Background and Notation
For t ∈ N, let Z 1 , ..., Z t be random variables each taking values in some set Z and with joint law P θ where θ ∈ Θ, for some set Θ. For ease of notation, we suppress the dependence of P θ on t, the number of random variables. In particular P θ (•|F t−1 ) denotes the law of Z t conditional on F t−1 , where F t−1 is the sigma algebra generated by (Z s ) s<t and F 0 is assumed to be trivial. It follows
where z t 1 := (z 1 , ..., z t ) (where the above are understood as distribution functions). We assume that P θ is absolutely continuous with respect to a sigma nite measure µ and dene its density (w.r.t. µ) by p θ . When θ ∈ Θ is unknown, the Bayesian estimator of p θ (z t 1 ) is given by
where w is a prior probability measure on subsets of Θ. Note that if we assume Θ compact, then Θ dw < ∞ for any sigma nite measure w. Hence, if w is a diuse prior on a Euclidean set Θ, then we shall assume Θ compact, so that we may always turn a sigma nite measure w into a probability measure by standardization.
Example 1 Suppose w is a uniform prior on Θ ⊂ R, then we just have w (dθ) = dθ/ |Θ|, where 1.3 Information Denseness and Resolvability Index For any θ ∈ Θ, T ∈ N, and δ > 0, dene the following set
To ease notation, we may write B T (θ, δ) = B T (θ) whichever is felt more appropriate for the situation. The set B T (θ, δ) is called information neighbor and is the set of subsets of Θ with expected total relative entropy less or equal to δ > 0. Then, the prior w is said to be information dense (at θ) if it assign strictly positive probability to each information neighbor of size δ T T , i.e. w (B T (θ, δ T T )) > 0 for any δ T > 0. Information denseness of the prior is often used in the Bayesian consistency literature (e.g. Barron, 1998 , Barron et al. 1999 . Note that the standard denition of B T (θ, δ) is in terms of either the individual or the average expected relative entropy.
For reasons that will become apparent later, we work with the total entropy, hence, to dene information denseness we need to consider information balls of total entropy less or equal to δ T T for any δ T > 0. Nevertheless, here we shall use a related and slightly weaker condition. To do so, we need to dene the following quantity
where R T (θ) /T is called resolvability index (e.g. Barron, 1998) . A candidate δ in the above display is of the form δ = δ T T where δ T → 0 as T → 0 (this is consistent with the notion of information denseness for neighbors of size δ T T ). It can be shown that if w is information dense, then, R T (θ) /T → 0 as T → ∞ (Lemma 1). We state the condition that is used to show universality.
Condition 1
Information denseness and Condition 1 are slightly stronger than needed. In fact the following weaker condition would suce: there is a set
and {δ T T − ln w (A T )} /T → 0 as T → ∞. This clearly resembles the index of resolvability and requires δ T → 0. It turns out that the set B T (θ, δ) ⊆ A T (θ, δ) for any δ > 0.
The following summarizes the above remarks.
Lemma 1 An information dense prior w (at θ) implies lim T →∞ R T (θ) /T = 0 and the latter implies (5) with lim T →∞ {δ T T − ln w (A T )} /T = 0.
In practice, verication of the above conditions is almost equivalent. Given that the index of resolvability provides an upper bound in most of the results, we shall use this as our default condition. Moreover, for two of the results to be stated (Theorem 5 and 6), (5) will not be sucient. This suggests that Condition 1 is the relevant assumption to make for universality in a general framework.
By direct inspection of (4), Condition 1 is automatically satised with δ = 0 if Θ is countable and nite and w puts strictly positive mass to each element of Θ (see the proof of Theorem 3, for details). Section 3.1 provides remarks on how to check Condition 1 in a special important case.
The next section gives a fairly complete picture of universality of Bayesian predictions in a variety of contexts.
Universality Results
The previous section provided essential background on Bayesian prediction, its interpretations and discussed information denseness and negligibility of the resolvability index (Condition 1). Here we shall discuss universality results that can be derived from Condition 1 and obvious extensions to cover more general cases. At rst, the standard well known result about Bayesian predictions is stated. Then, we show how this result can be used to prove Bayesian prediction under almost arbitrary loss functions. Furthermore, we look at universal bounds for Bayesian model averaging and the problem of Bayesian prediction in a non-stationary environment is discussed. In the last case, the standard posterior update is not adequate, but we can shrink the posterior in order to account for the uncertainty due to non-stationarity. Finally we discuss the problem of miss-specication.
Explicit nite sample upper bounds are provided for most of these problems.
Universality of Probability Forecasts
The following establishes universality of Bayesian predictions in the simplest case.
Theorem 1 Using the notation in (4)
so that under Condition 1, the prediction is universal, i.e.
The upper bound is derived under no assumptions on the prior w and the r.h.s. can be innite. Condition 1 makes sure that the bound is o (T ) as T → ∞. Theorem 1 is well known (e.g. Barron, 1998) and it is a starting point for many other results to be discussed next. However, to give a simple econometric application of this result, consider the autoregressive process Z t = θZ t−1 + X t where (X t ) t∈N is an iid sequence with distribution function P (x) so that P θ (z|F t−1 ) = P (z − θZ t−1 ), and Z 0 = z is given. If [0, 1] ⊆ Θ, under Condition 1, we obtain universality even when θ = 1, i.e.
the Bayesian prediction performs uniformly well without need to worry about the possible presence of a unit root, and Theorem 1 gives a nite sample upperbound for the loss in the prediction. For example, in the Holder continuity case to be discussed in (15) (e.g. X t is Gaussian noise, Cauchy, etc.), the resolvability index would be O (ln T /T ). It is clearly unthinkable to derive such uniform where E w t stands for expectation with respect to P w (•|F t ). We shall see that this prediction satises some desirable properties. To be more specic, we need the following.
Remark 1 As for the relative entropy,
is the predictor that minimizes the loss L under expectation w.r.t. P θ (•|F t−1 ). Hence, universality implies
in L 1 (P θ ) and consequently in P θ -probability for any θ ∈ Θ.
The following gives conditions under which the predictions f 1 (w) , ..., f T (w) are universal for a loss function L.
Condition 2 For any θ ∈ Θ and t ∈ N,
Remark 2 Further remarks on Condition 2 can be found in Section 4.2.
We have the following result.
Theorem 2 Under Condition 2,
and, if Condition 1 holds as well, the Bayesian predictions f 1 (w) , ..., f T (w) are universal.
Remark 3 Theorem 2 says that if we use the Bayesian predictor (7), we can expect an average conditional prediction error asymptotically equal (in L 1 (P θ )) to the average conditional prediction error obtained using the optimal predictions f 1 (θ) , ..., f T (θ). It is actually possible to write a proper upperbound in terms of constants that depend on the moments of the loss function only. In the case of a bounded loss function the rate of convergence is the square root of the one given by Theorem 1 up to a multiplicative constant (see the proof of Theorem 2 for details) . Merhav and Feder (1998) 
Universality of Bayesian Model Averaging
Parameter uncertainty in the model {P θ : θ ∈ Θ} can be extended to model uncertainty. It is convenient to suppose K parameter spaces Θ 1 , ..., Θ K within which each model is indexed, e.g.
where
and w k , m are probability measures on subsets of Θ k and K, respectively. By induction, we have
In this case, universality of the Bayesian prediction is understood as in Denition 1 where Θ := k∈K Θ k .
For universality we need the following additional condition.
Condition 3 For any k ∈ K, m (k) is bounded away from zero.
Hence, we can state the following.
Theorem 3 We have the following upperbound,
so that under Condition 1 and 3, the predictions are universal, i.e. 
Universality over Time Varying Reference Classes
In some situations we would like the Bayesian prediction to perform well when θ varies over time.
We may think of this problem as the one when there are switches in regimes but we try not to make any assumptions on the dynamics (see Hamilton, 2005 , for a review of parametric regime switches models). In this case, standard learning by Bayes rule is not appropriate and need to be modied.
In fact, the application of Bayes theorem to derive P w is based on θ constant overtime, i.e. it uses the joint distribution
while, here, we are interested in the joint distribution
where θ S 1 := (θ 1 , ..., θ S ), and 0 = T 0 < T 1 < ... < T s = T are arbitrary, but xed.
Example 3 Suppose that
is a Markov transition distribution. If θ s does not vary over time, the transition distribution is homogeneous (i.e. stationary). Allowing for θ s to vary with time leads to a inhomogeneous Markov transition distribution.
To ease notation dene the time segments
. To be precise, the notation should make explicit not only θ s 1 , but also T 1 , ..., T S . For simplicity the times of the parameter's change are omitted, as they will be clear from the context, if necessary.
The problem of universality of the predictions is formalized by the following denition.
Denition 3 The prediction p w is universal for
Note that in the above denition S may go to innity with T . To allow for changing θ when the time of change is not known apriori, we need to introduce a prior on the probability of changes. The simplest approach that leads to constructive results is to dene a probability measure on subsets of N: for each t, λ t (r) is a probability density w.r.t. the counting measure with support in {0, 2, ..., t}, so that t r=0 λ t (t − r) = 1. Then we mix past posteriors using λ t (r) as mixing density:
The Bayesian interpretation is that with probability λ t (r) the posterior of θ at time t is equal to the posterior dw (θ|F r ) at time r + 1 < t. This means that at any point in time we may expect shifts that take us back to a past regime. When r = 0 we are taken back to the prior, which corresponds to the start of a new regime that has not previously occurred. This is the intuition behind (9) and will be further developed next.
We shall use D Ts (P θ P θ ) := D Ts−1+1,Ts (P θ P θ ) for the relative entropy over the time interval T s . To prove universality, we need a condition slightly stronger than Condition 1.
Condition 4 For any θ s ∈ Θ, T s , s ≤ S and δ > 0 dene the following set
and the following unstandardized resolvability index
For deniteness, two special cases will be considered. In one case we make no assumption on the type of changes, and only assume that there are S − 1 changes. Hence, in this case any change could be a new regime and past information might be useless. For this reason, we shall just shrink the posterior towards the prior. In the second case, we assume that there are S − 1 shifts in the parameter, but that these shifts are back and forth within a small number of V < S regimes (i.e.
parameters). The details will become clear in due course.
Shrinking towards the Prior
We restrict λ t such that λ t (t) = 1 − λt −α , λ t (0) = λt −α , and λ t (r) = 0 otherwise, with α ≥ 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1). This means that (9) simplies to
Theorem 4 Using (11), for any segments T 1 , ..., T S ,
so that the prediction is universal under Condition 4 if S ln T = o (T ).
Remark 5 If
in fact, the second term in the bound of Theorem 4 is monotonically decreasing in α. Increasing α does however increase the last term in the bound, i.e. αS ln T .
In the bound of Theorem 4, α and λ are free parameters whose choice can be based on prior knowledge or subjective believes. If S is of large order, we could minimize the bound setting λ close to one and α close to zero. This is just a loose remark whose only purpose is to suggest that as the number of shifts increases relatively to T , we are better o shrinking towards the prior. This idea can be related to the debate about equally weighted model averaging when we want to hedge against non-stationarity (e.g. Timmermann, 2006 , for discussions). Clearly, exact prior knowledge of T (in the sense of number of predictions to be made) and S would allow us to minimize the bound w.r.t. the free parameters.
In Theorem 4,
by Condition 4. However the above resolvability index can be quite large as the order of magnitude of S increases. Moreover, all the shifts might not be to new regimes, hence, it could be advantageous to use past information hoping to reduce the resolvability index. This issue will be addressed next.
Improvements on the Resolvability Index: Switching within a Small Number of Parameters
We now consider the case of shifting parameter within a set of V xed parameters. Hence, even if S → ∞ we may still have V = O (1) so that over the S − 1 shifts we move back and forth V regimes. In particular, to setup notation, there are S − 1 shifts within θ 1 , ...,θ V ⊂ Θ, V < S. 
Remark 6 Note that
with equality in some special important cases as in (15) .
The simplest approach to let λ t (r) > 0 for r ∈ [0, t] is to directly extend the density λ t (r) in the previous subsection: λ t (t) = 1 − λt −α , λ t (r) = λt −(1+α) when r ∈ [0, t) and α and λ are as previously constrained. Direct calculation shows that λ t (r) is a probability density (w.r.t. the counting measure) on [0, t] ∩ N, leading to the following posterior update
Under the above update, we can derive the following bound for S − 1 shifts within V regimes.
Theorem 5 Using (12), for any segments T 1 , ..., T S , for S shifts in θ s within a xed but arbitrary
that the prediction is universal under Condition 5 if S ln T = o (T ).
Remark 7 Theorem 5 leads to a considerable decrease in the resolvability index when V is xed and S → ∞. However, comparison with Theorem 4 shows that this comes at the extra cost of an error term S ln T together with an improvement in
Section 3.3 provides further remarks on the improvement in the resolvability index using λ t (r) > 0 for r ∈ [0, t] when there are only V regimes, in a special important case. For the case to be considered in Section 3.3, it can be shown that the gain in the resolvability index together with the gain in (13) is oset by S ln T , though only asymptotically. It is a matter of simple algebra to show that for nite T and large S we can nd α 0 and λ close to one such that the result in Theorem 5 strictly improves Theorem 4. Moreover, for comparisons, we do not need the α in Theorem 5 to be the same as in Theorem 4. However, note that Theorems 4 and 5 only provide upperbounds, so that one has to be cautious about comparisons. When Θ is countable and nite, Bousquet and Warmuth (2002) provide encouraging simulation evidence in favor of mixing past posteriors using λ t (r) > 0 (r ∈ [0, t]) when V is small and S is large. This is exactly the case when one would be expected to use α close to zero and λ close to one (recall the discussion just after Theorem 4). According to these remarks, the mixing update in (12) should be used with small α and large λ if we expect S to be relatively large and V small so that the resulting loss should dominate the one incurred using the update in (11).
We now consider a second case that further improves on the previous result. This can be achieved by letting λ t (r) put less and less mass on the remote past. To this end we consider the following simple case:
, for 0 ≤ r < t where
is a normalizing factor and α and λ are as previously restricted. This means that we shall consider the following update
Theorem 6 Using (14) instead of (12) in Theorem 5,
so that the prediction is universal under Condition 5 if S ln T = o (T ).
Remark 8 Theorem 6 shows that the extra cost S ln T in Theorem 5 can be reduced to 2S ln
if we use (14) instead of (12). By the same method of proof, we can consider other mixing distributions. For example, the case
−γ (r < t), where γ > 2, with suitably modied A t , is dealt similarly, but seems to lead to a more complex bound.
Bounds when the True Model is not in the Reference Class
The previous results considered the case where expectation is taken with respect to one element within a class of models, e.g. {P θ : θ ∈ Θ}. This implies that we only face estimation error. However, when expectation is taken with respect to a probability P / ∈ {P θ : θ ∈ Θ}, we shall also incur an approximation error. This approximation error can be characterized in terms of the relative entropy. With no loss of generality, we assume that P is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the sigma nite measure µ and we denote its density by p, so that
where E t−1 is expectation w.r.t. P (•|F t−1 ). Note that this does not imply that P is absolutely continuous w.r.t. P θ , however, if this is not the case, their relative entropy is innite. We shall also use E for (unconditional) expectation w.r.t. P . We need the following condition that extends Condition 2 to the present more general framework.
Condition 6 Dene
Then, for any θ ∈ Θ and t ∈ N,
for some r > 1.
Then, we have the following that also gives the extra error term due to the approximation.
Theorem 7 Under Condition 6
.
Remark 9 By the following inequality
we deduce that if Condition 1 holds, the Bayesian prediction might not be universal, but will lead to the smallest possible information loss, i.e. inf θ∈Θ ED 1,T (P P θ ) /T .
Discussion

Remarks on Condition 1
Verication of Condition 1 requires smoothness of the total relative entropy. For simplicity suppose Θ ⊂ R (the discussion easily extends to more general metric spaces, not just Euclidean spaces).
Smoothness can be formalized in terms of a Holder's continuity condition:
for some a, b > 0 . In this case, we set δ = T b |θ − θ| a and
Assuming for simplicity the Lebesgue measure as prior and Θ having unit Lebesgue measure,
which is minimized by δ = a −1 so that the resolvability index is equal to
and the average relative entropy converges to zero at the rate ln T /T for any Holder's continuous class of expected conditional log-likelihoods. To put (15) into perspective, note that dierentiability of the expected conditional log-likelihood per observation is stronger than (15) . We give a prototypical example where standard maximum likelihood methods are known to fail for some parameter values.
Example 4 Suppose (Z t ) t∈N is a sequence of iid random variables with double exponential density (15) holds with a = 1, while p θ is not dierentiable at θ = 0.
Remarks on Condition 2
Condition 2 needs to be checked on a case by case basis and might be hard to verify except for some special cases (e.g. when L is the square loss and p θ is Gaussian). Simplicity can be gained by restricting the set F over which to carry out minimization. For example, we may choose F to contain all the function such that |f | ≤ g where g is some measurable function such that sup θ∈Θ E θ g < ∞.
In this case, restrictions on the loss function may lead to feasible computations. We provide a simple example next.
Example 5 Suppose
is a Markov transition density. Then, we may restrict F to contain only functions f such that |f (z)| ≤ g (z) = 1+b |z| a for some a, b > 0. Suppose that the loss function can be bounded as follows L (z, f ) ≤ |z| + |f |. Then, to check Condition 2 it is sucient to check
and the right hand bound might be easier to deal with ( is ≤ up to a multiplicative nite absolute constant). 
3.3
Improvement on the Resolvability Index of Theorem 6 over Theorem
4
Consider the Holder's continuity condition in (15) and the same prior as given in its discussion. To simplify suppose that all the time segments T s have same length T /S ∈ N. Then we shall choose
substituting the minimizer δ = a −1 . Clearly, if S is of large order this quantity will be large. On the other hand, in Theorem 6 we would have
substituting the minimizer δ = V / (aS). Unlike the former, this latter bound does not depend on the number of shifts S.
Further Remarks
This paper provided a comprehensive set of results for universal prediction using Bayes rule. The conditions used restricted Θ only implicitly. For Condition 1 to hold, Θ cannot be completely arbitrary, but the restrictions on Θ are quite mild. In fact, we could let Θ be a set of densities and w a prior on it. Hence, the results stated here are not necessarily restricted to parametric models (e.g. Barron et al, 1999 , for results in this direction).
The relative improvement on the resolvability index when we mix past posteriors (and not just the prior, i.e. (11)) might be oset by an extra term that enters the error bound. This extra term depends on the mixing update. For the updates considered, it is possible to show superiority in nite samples only in some special cases by ne tuning of α and λ. Given that the improvement on the resolvability index is independent of the mixing scheme (as long as λ t (r) > 0 for r ∈ [0, t])
one could try to study and compare dierent updates. For example, we showed that (14) already improved upon (12) . Perhaps, more denite claims could be made if a dierent method of proof were used.
There is a number of topics of practical relevance that have not been discussed. Among the most important omitted issues are computational issues, but references have been provided in the Introduction. In general, computational improvements may be obtained by restricting Θ to be compact and choose a prior from which simulation is easy. Computational problems in Bayesian methods is an active area of research.
Some theoretical issues not discussed here deserve attention. In particular the problem of model complexity should be mentioned. 
using (1) (see Lemma 2 for the derivation). Hence, summing over t and taking full expectation, the sum telescopes apart from initial h negative terms which can be disregarded in the upper bound plus the last h + 1 terms which are kept:
The above display shows that the bounds grow linearly in h. In order to derive an h steps ahead prediction we could start from the joint conditional distribution of Z t+h t and integrate out Z t+h−1 t . Unfortunately, doing so, (16) is not valid anymore. Moreover, the above approach does not allow us to work directly with the h steps ahead predictive distribution and requires specifying the joint distribution of a segment given the past, which is potentially a more dicult task. More research eort is required in this direction using possibly dierent convergence requirements.
A Appendix: Proofs
The proofs may refer to some technical lemmata stated at the end of the section.
Proof. [Lemma 1] Information denseness implies − ln w (B T (θ, δ T T )) < ∞ for any δ T > 0.
can be made arbitrary small by choosing δ T → 0. This implies
Proof. [ 
by (27) (with S = 1) and (28) in Lemma 5. By Condition 4, as in the proof of Theorem 1,
Hence, this display and the previous one implies the result.
The following notation will be used in some of the remaining proofs. Proof. [Theorem 5 and 6] For each s ∈ {1, ..., S}, denẽ
by Denition of B v θ v , δ S 1 . By (9) and (10), u s is absolutely continuous w.r.t. w t because λ t (0) > 0. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 4,
Though the sum for s runs from 1 to S, there are only V dierent shifts, i.e. u s ∈ {ũ 1 , ...,ũ V }. For each s we can choose r s so that the sum in the brackets in (21) 
[because the second integral in the brackets is positive]
substituting (19) and evaluating the integral. To prove the theorems, it is sucient to bound
uniformly in r s . To this end, for both updates 
by the same arguments and notation in (22) . Recalling that in (22) we set r v(s+1) = T v(s+1)−1 −T v(s) and r v(1) = T v(1)−1 , we bound 
Putting everything together gives the bound for I under Theorem 6. The results are then given backing up all the previous bounds and substituting them in (23), substituting this equation and (22) in (21) and nally substituting (21) in (20) .
and M c P for its complement. Then, following the proof of Theorem 2, using Condition 6 instead of Condition 2, and the just dened notation,
To bound I, by the properties of the KL divergence
by (4) . To bound II, mutatis mutandis, as in the proof of Theorem 2, by Condition 6, by (9) noting that all the terms in the summation in (9) are positive. Writing ln λ t−1−r (t − 1 − r) outside and summing over t, with r = 0 when T s−1 + 1 < t ≤ T s and leaving r arbitrary but xed when t = T s−1 + 1 and s > 1, ln λ t−1 (t − 1) − ln λ Ts−1 (T s−1 − r) .
We still need to deal with the case t = 1. In this case, note that w 0 = w 0 so that we can directly substitute in (26) without incurring the extra error − ln λ 0 (0) at the rst trial (note that a fortiori, r = 0). By a change of variable in the sums, the results follow.
Lemma 5 Using the notation of Theorem 4, for α ≥ 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1), ≤ 0 because the argument of ln is less than one.
